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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 387 
Accident time: 10:00 Accident Date: 03/07/2001 
Where it occurred: Gecheguzlu Yatagy Country: Azerbaijan 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [Not dated] 
ID original source: EC UNOPS Name of source: ANAMA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Fuze (TM57 AT blast) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created: 22/02/2004 Date  last modified: 22/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: MF GY002 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
 
Accident report 
A summarised Board of Inquiry report was made available in January 2004. It is reproduced 
below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Report of Board of Enquiry investigation of Mine Accident at Gecheguzlu Yatagy on 
3rd July 2001 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the mine accident that happened at Gecheguzlu Yatagy on 3rd July 2001 a board 
of Enquiry was convened by the director of ANAMA to investigate the incident. The board was 
comprised of: - 
1 
UNOPS RTA, Chairman ANAMA Operations Manager (Acting) ANAMA Quality Assurance 
Officer Relief Azerbaijan Operations Manager ANAMA Regional Administrator. 
Contributions to the enquiry were also submitted to the board by the ANAMA doctor. 
 
2. Background to Accident 
The demining team were carrying out demining operations at minefield GY002 as directed in 
task order number 15/01 dated 14April 01, under the supervision of the team leader and the 
overall supervision of the [International demining group] Technical Trainer. 
 
3. Summary of the Accident 
The mine accident happened at 10:00 hrs on the 3rd July 2001 while the [Demining group] 
were conducting manual clearance operations at minefield GY002. During manual clearance 
operations using the one-man drill on Gecheguzlu Yatagy 002, deminer [name excised] was 
involved in a mine accident that resulted in blast injures to the deminers right hand. 
The deminer had a signal when using his mine detector which he investigated with a prodder 
and then excavated using a trowel. After exposing the item that had given the signal the 
deminer removed it from the ground using his right hand. The item exploded when it was 
picked up resulting in the traumatic amputation of part of the index finger and part of the 
thumb. The preliminary investigation has established that the item was the detonator 
assembly from a TM57 mine fuse. 
 
3. Reasons for and causes of the accident 
The Board of Enquiry have established the following facts: - 
a. The demining site had been established and organized in line with national 
standards and agency SOPs and include the correct layout, safety facilities and medical 
cover. 
b. The correct levels of supervision were being applied. 
c. The deminer [the Victim] was carrying out the correct procedures for manual 
demining as he had been taught and as is specified in the RA agency SOPs. He also carried 
out the procedures for investigation of a mine detector signal as he had been taught and as is 
specified in the RA agency SOPs. 
d. The emergency response to the accident and the subsequent casualty 
evacuation was carried out correctly and efficiently. 
The accident was caused by the fact that the deminers did not recognise the item that he 
found as being dangerous, he therefore considered the item to be a piece of scrap metal and 
handled it accordingly. During the deminers’ training they were taught how to recognise mines 
and UXOs as well as their fusing systems but not the component parts of fuzes. They have 
also been taught how to handle items based on their being dangerous items or scrap items. 
 
4.        Recommendations 
The board of enquiry recommends the following: - 
a. Additional training should be given to the deminers to enable them to recognise 
component parts of mines, UXOs and fuses that may be dangerous. 
b. Scrap handling procedures should be changed in line with the attached proposed 
SOP amendment and deminers should be taught the new procedures. 
Details of the recommendations are attached at Annex C. [Reproduced below.] 
Signed: UNOPS RTA, RA Operations Manager, Regional Administrator, Acting Operations 




Date: 18 July 2001 
To: Director ANAMA 
CC: BOE Members 
From: UNOPS RTA  
Subject: Board of Enquiry Recommendations 
It has been identified by the Board of Enquiry into the mine accident at Gecheguzlu Yatagy on 
3rd July 2001 that certain changes to deminer training and to RA SOPs will be necessary. 
Training should be undertaken at the earliest opportunity to teach the deminers how to 
identify the hazardous component parts of mine and UXO fusing systems. 
National Standards and agency SOPs should be amended to include 3 categories of items 




Dangerous: All items that are positively identified as Mines, UXOs or hazardous component 
parts. 
Suspect: All items that cannot be identified as Mines UXO or Hazardous component parts 
but cannot be positively identified as being safe. 
Safe:  Items that can be positively identified as being non hazardous. 
 
The procedure for dealing with these items should be as follows: 
Dangerous:  Destroy in situ. 
Suspect:  Deminer should request assistance from section or team leader to assist with 
identification, when in doubt suspect items should be destroyed in situ. 
Safe:  Deminer should remove and place in scrap bucket/container. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 503 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 







No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the investigators  
determined that the Victim did not know that what he had found was dangerous, and  
recommended extending the training.  
The accident investigation is listed under “Notes” as inadequate because it does not cover the 
topics recommended in the IMAS, including the PPE worn and the medical and evacuation 
details. The report provided was a “summary” and will be replaced with a full version when 
possible. 
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